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This article discusses the ways in which the relations among professional and 
non-professional participants in co-creative relations are being reconfigured as 
part of the shift from a closed industrial paradigm of expertise toward open and 
distributed expertise networks. This article draws on ethnographic consultancy 
research undertaken throughout 2007 with Auran Games, a Brisbane, Australia 
based games developer, to explore the co-creative relationships between 
professional developers and gamers. This research followed and informed 
Auran’s online community management and social networking strategies for Fury 
(http://unleashthefury.com), a massively multiplayer online game released in 
October 2007. This paper argues that these co-creative forms of expertise 





The phenomenon of consumer created content and user-led innovation is 
reshaping the media industries as media consumers increasingly participate in 
the process of designing, producing and marketing media content and 
experiences (Hartley 2004; Jenkins 2006; Benkler 2006; Von Hippel 2006; Bruns 
2008). In the past few years these consumer-producer interactions have evolved 
to such an extent that they are now a significant source of both cultural and 
economic value creation. Processes of innovation are attributable not to firms 
alone but also to the creative participation and contributions of socially networked 
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consumers (Von Hippel 2006; OECD 2007)1. This re-engineering of producer-
consumer relations unsettles the closed paradigm of professional expertise that 
has dominated the organisation of media production throughout the industrial 
era. At the heart of these transformations and value creating activities is a 
blurring of the professional-amateur divide and an increasingly interdependent 
relationship between professional media producers and users (Jenkins 2007: 50-
58; Benkler 2007: 125-27; Bruns 2008: 214-19 )  
 
Commentators such as Andrew Keen (2007) warn us that such a ‘cult of the 
amateur’ may well undermine and threaten our standards of cultural value. David 
Weinberger (2007), on the other hand, sees a potential democratising of cultural 
knowledge production in which forms of “social knowing” associated with blogs 
and other forms of “user-driven content” disrupt the centralised authority, power 
and control of traditional incumbent media industries (Jenkins 2007; Zittrain 
2008). But are these co-creative practices perhaps also an extraction of surplus 
value from the unpaid labour of the consumer participants that then also 
exacerbates the precarious employment conditions of professionals working in 
the creative industries (Ross 2006a, 2006b)? I will not engage in detail with these 
“free labour” (Terranova 2004) critiques in this paper as I have recently 
addressed these debates in a co-authored piece with Sal Humphreys (2008). 
The understanding of co-creative expertise that I develop here, however, 
suggests that such “free labour” approaches fail to recognise that co-creativity is 
generated through a dynamic and co-evolving relationship between the cultural 
and the economic, rather than a static face-off between these domains in which 
the gaining of value for one side necessarily means a loss for the other.  
 
I explore and refine this understanding of co-creative expertise by drawing on 
consultancy ethnographic research undertaken throughout 2007 with Auran 
Games (a Brisbane, Australia based games developer). Through this 
                                                 
1 Jonathan Zittrain (2008: 84) comments that “generatively-enabled activity by amateurs can lead 
to results that would not have been produced by a firm-mediated market model”  
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participatory-observation research I followed and informed Auran’s online 
community management and social networking strategies over the final stages of 
the development and launch of Fury, a competitive, player versus player (PvP), 
massively multiplayer online game (MMOG). This research focused on the co-
creative relationship between Auran’s professional developers and a network of 
gamers who provided the company with extensive play-testing feedback and 
creative design input. 
 
I propose that consumer co-creative expertise, understood and theorised as a 
social-network market (Potts, Cunningham et. al. 2008; Potts, Hartley et. al. 
2008; Banks and Humphreys 2008; Banks and Potts 2008), is a co-evolutionary 
dynamic of both economic and cultural change. Innovation, change, creativity 
and growth are then attributable not just to firms’ professional developers alone, 
but also to the distributed expertise and co-creative practices of socially 
networked citizen-consumers. This involves transactions and interchanges 
across forms of expertise that may appear to be incommensurable.  
 
‘It’s Your Game Now’? Negotiating Gamer Expertise 
 
T. L. Taylor (2006a: 159-60; 2006b) argues that players are co-creative 
“productive agents” in the creation of videogames and asserts that we need 
“more progressive models” for understanding players’ creative contribution to the 
making of these products and cultures.2 She asks (2006b), “what it might mean 
to move beyond simply managing player communities to enrolling them into the 
heart of design and game world discussion” Such a scenario poses expertise as 
a problem, as it asks us to consider extending expertise to player-consumers. It 
asks us to legitimate the role of players in the design decision-making process. 
But what does it mean to extend expertise beyond the boundaries of the firm to 
include the knowledge, skills and competencies of players? What are the 
                                                 
2 On the role of gamers as co-creators in the game production process also see Banks (2002; 
2007) and Humphreys (2005). 
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implications of such distributed co-creative expertise networks for our 
understanding of consumer and media culture?  
 
I should disclose at this point that from June 2000 through to June 2005 I was 
employed as Auran’s online community relations manager. This role largely 
involved managing Auran’s relations with an online rail-fan community that 
formed around the game development project, Trainz: a train and railroad 
simulator first released in 2001 (Banks 2002, Banks 2007; Banks and 
Humphreys 2008). In late 2006 Auran management approached me to provide 
them with consultancy advice on their relationship with an online gamer 
community forming around the final stages of the development and launch of 
Fury. Auran’s CEO, Tony Hilliam believed that the support and endorsement of 
hard-core PvP gamers would be crucial for Fury’s commercial success. As he put 
it to me:  
 “We need to involve them, we need their input. It must be their game. 
And we’ve already made a start on this. We are already working with a 
core group of player-testers who are providing us with feedback on 
very early builds of the game. But we now need to expand on that and 
build interest and enthusiasm for the game as we ramp up to release 
later in 2007” 
 
Undertaking this research involved working closely for extended periods 
throughout 2007 with members of Auran’s online community relations team, 
Fury’s developers, and Auran senior management. I also participated in pre-
release play testing of Fury, joining in extensive play and feedback sessions with 
the Fury gamers, as well as interviewing gamers participating in this co-creative 
relationship with Auran. Through this research then I participated in the making 
and negotiation of emergent co-creator relations. More specifically, I consider 
how the design and production practice of Auran’s professional creatives 
(designers, producers, community managers, etc.) were disrupted and unsettled 
by the need to negotiate with the expertise and knowledge of players. With this in 
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mind, much of the ethnographic material I draw on for this article tends to be 
written from the perspective of Auran’s professional developers. When I draw on 
interviews with the gamers, forum posts made by the gamers or my participation 
in play test sessions with the gamers, I am focusing on how the gamers’ 
expertise was integrated into Auran’s design and production processes. 
I do not claim to occupy a neutral observer status in relation to these co-
creative practices. My research practice aimed to assist Auran with better 
understanding and managing their relationship with the co-creator gamers. I 
worked closely with Auran’s community relations team and members of the 
design team as they grappled with the challenges of what it meant to 
involve and integrate the players into the development process. I 
contributed to meetings, informal discussions and email exchanges in which 
the role and significance of the players’ contribution to the design process 
were debated. The expertise of the ethnographer is therefore also at stake 
in the distributed expertise network that I’m describing.  
 
Over the final twelve months of Fury’s development, the Auran development and 
community relations teams recruited a core group of experienced PvP MMOG 
gamers to participate in the process of testing and refining the game’s design. 
Many of these gamers were leaders of high profile PvP guilds that were active in 
successful MMOG games such as GuildWars and World of Warcraft. In the 
months prior to commercial launch, these expert gamers exhaustively play-tested 
Fury, dedicating many thousands of hours to providing the Auran development 
team with robust and critical feedback. In pursuit of innovation and commercial 
success, Auran relied then not only on the creativity of internal professional 
developers, but also on a distributed network of expert, skilled and 
knowledgeable consumer co-creators operating over social networks of guilds, 
fansites and other new media.  
 
On 13 December 2007, two months after Fury’s release, Auran Developments 
Pty Ltd went into voluntary administration. Some 50 staff lost their jobs in the 
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wake of the commercial failure of Fury – a three year project costing $15 million.  
The difficulties of successfully managing the interface between the professional 
development team and the expert gamer-testers contributed to Fury’s failure. In a 
post-mortem interview with me shortly after announcing the voluntary 
administration, Auran’s CEO, Tony Hilliam commented that the online word of 
mouth from these networked consumer-citizens “has been the ultimate killer” for 
Fury. Many of the core player-testers expressed the view that Fury had been 
released too soon and the Auran developers had not gone far enough in 
responding to their critical feedback over the final stages of development. What 
went wrong and what can we learn from this?  
 
There was significant debate at Auran about the role and importance of these co-
creative gamers’ to Fury’s success or failure.  Many of the leads in the 
development team (for example, the lead designer and senior producer), while 
regularly expressing support for the importance of the gamer community to 
Fury’s success, seemed to understand this as largely a marketing and 
communication function. On crucial issues of fundamental game design they 
were generally reluctant to give too much credence to the views and opinions of 
the players. This was their domain as professional developers and designers. As 
a range of design controversies flared in the core testing community over the 
final crucial few months of development, Auran management struggled to 
manage this tension between the expertise and creative control of the 
professional design team and the collective intelligence of the gamer community.  
 
After many weekends of play testing between August and late September 2007, 
the feedback from many of the hard-core gamers, particularly from some of the 
influential leading competitive guilds, indicated that wide-ranging and in some 
cases quite fundamental design changes were needed. The view was growing 
among the core testers that for some reason Auran was now compromising on 
their original commitment to develop and deliver a PvP and e-sports focused 
 7
MMOG. At this stage, only a matter of weeks from commercial launch, things 
were not looking promising for Fury. 
 
Field notes written during and after my regular visits to the Auran offices over 
these final few weeks of development and testing note that in my opinion the 
community relations team were also losing confidence in the lead designer’s and 
producer’s willingness to accept the critical feedback expressed by many of the 
core player-testers. One of the community managers felt the lead designer was 
not taking seriously the feedback coming through from the core testers. He was 
actively lobbying Auran senior management on behalf of the player-testers, 
arguing that Fury’s commercial success was in serious jeopardy if many of the 
key changes were not made. He believed many of the leading guilds and 
influential players were close to abandoning the game. 
  
In early October 2007, only three weeks before commercial release, Tony Hilliam 
directed that significant design changes needed to be made. He drafted and 
released a forum post and email newsletter addressed to the core PvP gamers 
announcing this major direction change: 
 We’ve been receiving a lot of feedback about the state of Fury. We’ve 
taken some time to assess that feedback and will shortly be 
announcing some wide ranging changes to Fury. Put simply: the 
community made its desires known, we’ve listened, and we’ve been 
convinced that changes need to happen.  
The announcement briefly outlined many of the major changes that the core 
player-testers had been consistently requesting and included the comment,  
This really is your game now [my italics], it is our task as developers to 
listen and react by deciding how and when to implement 
improvements…. Now is the time to get your Guild-mates to come 
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onto the forums to discuss these changes and help us make Fury the 
number 1 PvP game on the market.  
The response from many in the player community was immediate, enthusiastic 
and generally positive. However, the gamers met Auran’s eventual December 
release of the promised update with anger, frustration and disappointment. The 
development team had chosen to ignore the feedback from the hard-core PvP 
testers and taken the design in the direction of hopefully appealing to a more 
mainstream and casual gamer market. In an extended post to the Fury forum, 
respected community member and long time Fury tester, Republica, criticised the 
Auran developers and designers for failing to make the changes that many 
players had been requesting. Responding to a post by Fury’s lead designer, 
Adam Carpenter, in which he seeks to justify Auran’s refusal to introduce some 
of the requested changes, Republica comments:  
‘Please understand that I say this with the most heartfelt respect and 
compassion to you and your team: you are standing on very, very thin 
ice. Considering the amount of investment in this game, you need to 
be very careful with how you treat your players. We loved the idea, but 
now we’re being told that the one thing we really can’t stand about the 
game isn’t going to change because you don’t want to change it. And I 
hope you can understand that this is a bit insulting, and doesn’t make 
it a game a lot of us will continue to play. It’s also probably a huge 
reason behind why you’re not getting better word of mouth publicity 
from the PvP crowd’. (Forum Post, 16 January 2008).  
There were many forum posts made by gamers, including influential guild 
leaders, which expressed very similar viewpoints. This is a brief example extract 
from the many extensive forum posts, email exchanges and online in-game chat 
discussions through which these game testers provided Auran with feedback. I 
participated in many of these online exchanges, including extensive online and 
in-game chats with long-standing player-testers who expressed surprise and 
disappointment at what they regarded as the Auran development team’s failure 
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to take into account their feedback over the final stages of development. Of 
course forum posts such as Republica’s had a contested status in the Auran 
development team’s design decisions. The lead designer and producer regularly 
questioned the validity of forum posts as a reliable guide to gamers’ experience 
of Fury. In informal discussions with me, the designer would argue that he could 
point to just as many posts that offered alternative viewpoints. He commented 
that great care should be exercised when evaluating a game’s design based on 
forum posts:  
…. they’re just too unreliable and all over the place. One post or 
thread will tell you one thing, but read on and other gamers will be 
arguing just as vehemently and passionately for the opposite case. 
We see that all the time. You cannot change a game’s design based 
on what you’re reading in the latest hot forum thread. Who would you 
listen to? 
He referred to this as the risk of turning Fury into a “design by committee mess”. 
Auran’s community relations managers on the other hand referred me to 
Republica’s forum posts as in their opinion offering a well articulated and argued 
perspective on Fury’s problems. I was also referred to Republica’s posts by many 
of the long-standing and committed Fury play-testers. Many of these core testers, 
like Republica, took Auran’s invitation that “this is your game now” seriously. 
They expected Auran to deliver on its commitment to listen and to make the key 
changes that the players demanded. When the Auran development team failed to 
deliver on this commitment, the support and endorsement of these core players 
quickly evaporated.  
 One of Auran’s community managers was becoming increasingly critical of the 
development teams reluctance to respond to the feedback from the experienced 
PvP gamers. In an interview with me conduced in late December 2007, he 
commented: 
 The problem was no one from design wanted to listen to us…. Maybe 
it was because the designers and devs didn’t like hearing the 
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criticism…. The devs say the feedback coming through wasn’t 
representative of a broader casual gamer market. I’ve never got that 
and I think it is just an excuse for not listening and not making 
changes soon enough. The devs for whatever reason didn’t want to 
listen to the feedback. This was great input from really experienced 
hard-core players. These guys put in a lot of time testing. Why just 
ignore that? I can also tell you that the server stats show many of 
these testers were racking up more game time, much more, than the 
designers and devs were. Think about that, they probably knew the 
game systems and how they played better than the designers did. 
Why didn’t we respect that? 
 
The community manager’s question gets us to the crux of the problem of co-
creative expertise. Integrating players into the heart of the design process means 
extending the recognised sources of expertise beyond Fury’s immediate 
professional development team to include the community relations team, an 
ethnographer and the led core gamers. This problem and challenge of 
coordinating often competing and divergent if not incommensurable forms of 
expertise in the design decision-making process gets us to the core dilemma of 
distributed expertise networks.  
 
In an extensive post-mortem interview in late 2007 with Adam Carpenter, Fury’s 
lead-designer, it became apparent that the development team had a very 
different understanding of what ‘this is your game now’ meant, particularly in the 
context of making key design decisions. When I put the community manager’s 
question and criticisms to Carpenter and also raised with him the anger and 
frustration expressed by the core-testers, he replied: 
 A couple of key things. The hardcore community generally doesn’t 
understand how long it takes and what is required to make the 
changes they want. Even with a lot of our hardcore people who we 
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assumed were advanced enough gamers to understand stuff, when 
we did explain combat mechanics concepts that were crucial to the 
design, well they still really didn’t understand it. Even though these are 
people with a lot of gaming experience, and we very much respect 
their opinion, we never got them to get outside of their own personal 
view and to see it from a much higher level design perspective. In 
terms of a lot of changes requested, even among the hardcore group, 
there were very diverse views. It wasn’t necessarily a unified front or 
opinion that we were hearing. They weren’t speaking with a clear 
enough or consistent voice for us to say ‘yes this is definitely a 
problem’ and likewise the feedback that we were getting was not 
necessarily from more moderate, casual gamers who were playing 
Fury. In some ways our community team could have helped us do a 
better job by including a more diverse range of feedback and not 
concentrating so much on just the hardcore. 
Opening Fury’s development to this distributed knowledge network of expert 
gamers provided useful critical feedback and forward marketing. But it also 
exposed Auran to management challenges by disrupting a closed industrial 
model of expertise in favour of an open innovation model. Many of Auran’s senior 
managers failed to recognise that harnessing the support and input of these 
players involves an implicit recognition of the players’ expert status as co-
creators. Harnessing the benefits of a co-creative relationship came with a 
responsibility to respect that expertise, and when, in the minds of the player co-
creators at least, the developers failed to do so, an implicit contract was broken 
and a distributed asset of innovation and development turned rapidly into a 
market network liability.  
 
Co-creators and the ‘Crisis of Expertise’ 
 
How do we develop a framework or model of expertise that situates the expertise 
of citizen consumers in proper perspective alongside professional creatives’ 
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expertise in the fields of design and media production? This problem of 
“expertise extension” identified by H.M. Collins and Robert Evans (2002; 2007) 
acknowledges the need to extend the domain of technical decision-making 
beyond the confines of a professionally qualified elite to include, for example, the 
“experience-based expertise” of people that is not recognised by certification or 
professional standing. But Collins and Evans ask how do we then go about 
establishing grounds for limiting the extension of these decision-making rights 
(2002: 237)? They provide us with a starting point for undertaking this task by 
establishing the necessity of recognising and categorising different types of 
expertise. They then argue that it then becomes “possible to begin to think about 
how different kinds of expertise combine in social life, and how they combine in 
technical decision-making” (2002: 251).  
 
Fury’s success relied on combining the various forms of expertise possessed by 
the professional developers with the gamers’ expertise. Here it is not a situation 
of simply abandoning or displacing the expertise of the professionals. The point 
here is not that the professional designers were wrong while the gamers got it 
right. Instead, the professionals’ knowledge should have been added to by the 
contributions of the gamers. As Bruns (2008: 214-19) suggests, the challenge is 
to reconcile and interrelate “traditional expertise and emergent community 
knowledge structures”3. But as we see in the case of Fury, successfully 
combining and coordinating these various forms of expertise is much easier said 
than done. In this brief snap-shot of how the problem of expertise played out at 
Auran I have barely touched on the very real difficulties and challenges the 
developers confronted as they struggled to coordinate these often competing, 
conflicting and incommensurable knowledges, literacies and competencies. 
Throughout this research, Fury’s design team raised compelling difficulties and 
                                                 
3 In the context of a discussion of digital storytelling John Hartley (2008b) also suggests that this 
problem of expertise is about developing a dialogic approach between professional expert 
knowledge and amateur knowledge. He comments that “… the problem of the expertise of the 
facilitator … would not be solved by simply firing all the filmmakers and letting consumers get by 
on their own. It is important not to fall for an ‘either/or’model of digital storytelling: either expert or 
everyone.” 
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risks associated with integrating the gamers into the design decision-making 
process. These different knowledges and competenceis were aligning uneasily 
and often abrasively with the existing industrial media era institutions for project 
management and business process. Auran’s professional development teams 
are far from united in their understanding of and support for this co-creative 
production process. Producers, designers, programmers, artists, community 
relations managers, CEOs, expert gamers and ethnographic consultant 
researchers have very different understandings of and agendas for how these 
relationships should be managed and realised. It is from precisely these uneven, 
multiple and messy practices, negotiations, actants and materials that co-creative 
culture is made and negotiated. But in all of this what are the mechanisms and 
processes that may help us to better understand and grapple with these co-
creative expertise exchanges?  
 
We need to develop analytical tools and models that help us to work through the 
mechanisms that shape these emergent co-creative exchanges. I now turn to 
briefly propose a possible analytic framework that might potentially explicate the 
complex exchanges observed. This model of social-network markets is based on 
the notion that this problem of co-creative expertise is neither an economic nor a 
cultural phenomenon in itself, but rather the outcome of a co-evolutionary 
dynamic between both economic and cultural considerations. 
 
Expertise, ‘Trading Zones’ and ‘Social Network Markets’ 
 
In these contexts of asymmetrical co-creative expertise exchange the 
participants need to develop and use what Collins and Evans describe as 
“interactional expertise” (2002: 256; Collins and Evans 2007a; Collins 2004). 
Defined as (Collins and Evans 2007a: 14) “the ability to master the language of a 
specialist domain in the absence of practical competence”, interactional expertise 
is a translation role that facilitates and supports communication, dialogue and 
exchange across expertise domains. In developing this category of expertise, 
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Collins draws on his experience as an ethnographer studying scientists 
researching gravitational waves. He argues that through this participatory 
engagement with the scientists over an extended period he acquired 
competencies and communication skills that enabled him to contribute to 
discussions about the subject in a way that passes for expertise, although he 
does not possess the rigorous mathematical knowledge or core experimental 
skills required to participate fully in that domain of scientific research. Collins and 
Evans (2002, 2007a, 2007b) argue that this interactional expertise that often sits 
between and cuts across specific expertise domains is vital to the success of 
projects that involve collaboration across different expertise sub-groups.  
 
Collins, Evans and Gorman (2007) have refined further this idea of interactional 
expertise by drawing on Peter Galison’s (1997) term ‘trading zone’ to understand 
the exchanges and transactions that routinely occur in interdisciplinary scientific 
research across fields that may appear to be formally quite incommensurable. 
Galison emphasises the need to address communication problems across these 
domains by developing ‘in-between vocabularies’ and ‘inter-languages’. They 
identify the importance of interactional expertise to the successful development 
of trading zones as coordinating mechanisms. Collins, Evans and Gorman (2007: 
662) assert that “interactional expertise trading zones seem so widespread that it 
might be argued that it is the norm for new interdisciplinary work”. 
 
Co-creative expertise can be understood then as a coordination problem that 
requires the use of interactional expertise to create and facilitate trading zones. 
But developing interactional expertise is difficult and time consuming and project 
managers routinely underestimate its significance (Collins, Evans and Gorman 
2007: 663-65; Collins and Evans 2007). In the case of Fury it is arguable that we 
failed to construct an effective trading zone that supported interchange and 
transactions across the differing skills that needed to combine to identify and 
solve the game’s design problems. But is there an element of self-serving 
involved in identifying “interactional expertise” as the significant factor here? 
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Collins and Evans (2007; also see Collins 2004), for example, note that 
interactional expertise is a skill that is particularly characteristic of ethnographic 
work . This proposition then starts to look like “rent-seeking”; if we accept that 
trading zones are a mechanism for coordination, then the value and definition of 
particular expertises are at stake in these exchanges, including the value of 
ethnographic knowledge. I argue, however, that interactional expertise is also 
distributed and is certainly not exclusively exercised by ethnographers. It is a 
core skill of the community relations managers and it is a skill also exercised by 
community leaders such as Republica. And it is a skill that Auran undervalued to 
its cost. There is a lot more that needs to be said about trading zones and 
interactional expertise, however, I think that the idea of a trading zone as a place 
where problems of co-ordination are resolved provides us with a useful starting 
point for understanding co-creative expertise. But to develop this idea in the 
context of co-creative relations it is necessary to acknowledge that the 
asymmetries and incommensurabilities shaping these co-creative trading zones 
will be very different from those evident in interdisciplinary science research 
projects. For a start co-creative relations are fundamentally about a blurring of 
relations between economic and social domains. One of the advantages of 
approaching this as a “trading zone” is that it helps us to avoid a static or 
oppositional face-off between these domains and enables us to think about the 
dynamic relationships between them. 
 
Developing a model grounded in evolutionary economics, complexity theory, 
social network theory and cultural studies, Potts et al’s recent proposal that social 
network markets provide a new definition of the creative industries foregrounds 
the challenge of grappling with the implications of distributed co-creative 
expertise (Potts, Cunningham, Hartley and Ormerod 2008; also see Banks and 
Humphreys 2008). Potts et. al. (169) propose that consumer choice in the 
creative industries is not governed by just the “set of incentives described by 
conventional demand theory, but by the choices of others”. Social network 
markets then are fundamentally about “individual choice in the context of a 
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complex social system of other individual choice”. These co-creative relations are 
defined by contexts of simultaneous economic choice and cultural choice. 
Domains that are often characterised as distinct and incommensurable are 
coming together in hybrid social network market configurations. Co-creative 
culture then is about the emergence of new, unstable and disruptive market 
relations that include the entrepreneurial agency of media consumers as partners 
in co-creative relationships.  
 
The complex practices of negotiating and navigating across these social network 
relations that are simultaneously cultural and economic are at the core of the 
problem of co-creative expertise. This social network market model of consumer 
co-creation redraws analytic boundaries, such that distinctions between 
consumption and production processes are blurred; and, in the process, 
boundaries between the economy and culture are transformed and redrawn as 
each domain encroaches on and unsettles the other. Social network interactions 
among consumers thus begin to function in a way previously understood to be 
the exclusive domain of R&D laboratories or professional creative experts. In the 
case of Fury it means that design was no longer the exclusive preserve of the 
professional designers. Co-creative expertise concerns how organizations and 
institutions are evolving, often disruptively and uncomfortably, in the context of 
these changing production and consumption relations. This is a complex dynamic 
of change and feedback between consumption and production. These player-
consumers encountered in the Fury case study are not simply engaging in 




At the core of the social network markets model is a conception of consumers 
linked through social networks as agents engaged in productive exchange and 
value creation, not just as recipients of utility through consumption. These agents 
are assessing and making deals, they are exchanging money, attention, 
connectivity, content and ideas in conditions of uncertainty and risk. This social-
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network market approach foregrounds consumers as deal makers, agreeing to 
exchanges and negotiating the terms of these relationships based on some level 
of calculation of self-advantage as well as paying money or attention to the 
provider in a two-way transaction of complex network choices (Hartley 2008a).  
 
These co-creative consumers now judge companies such as Auran on how well 
they respond to their feedback and on how well they provide and deliver a 
service that effectively integrates the consumer across the creative development 
process. The positive word of mouth that Auran’s CEO hoped to harness doesn’t 
come for free. ‘Attention-economy’ (Lanham 2007) transactions or social network 
market exchanges play out here: the participation of the gamer consumers 
endorsing Fury through their fan social networks requires Auran in turn to 
recognise the status and contribution of the gamers’ expertise in the context of a 
co-creative relationship for mutual benefit. This is a demand driven dynamic in 
which the agency and choices of creative citizen-consumers and their social 
networks are fundamental.  
 
In this social network market model, creativity and innovation is situated across 
the production-consumption boundary in complex evolving networks among 
consumers, and between consumers and producers. This involves constructing 
and negotiating effective ‘trading-zones’ that facilitate and coordinate 
transactions across these various co-creative expertises. Here I am not 
proposing that these practices are seamlessly appropriated into existing stable 
market institutions to support a globally rampant industrial media economy. The 
salient point introduced by the social network market model is that this is not a 
static or closed situation in which we can clearly and definitively identify what are 
market or non-market motivations, incentives or behaviours. Instead, these 
emergent co-creative practices potentially redefine our understandings of what 
markets are and how they operate in relation to social and cultural networks. 
These are markets because exchange occurs, but it is social connections and 
recommendations, access and attention that performs the coordinating function, 
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not price. The social networks markets perspective suggests that co-creative 
expertise is not fundamentally a binary choice between professional experts and 
amateurs or between markets and non-markets, but rather is about the 
emergence of coordinating mechanisms that shape the development of markets 
and may even give rise to new markets. This is not about markets traditionally 
understood as mechanisms for efficiently allocating resources. This is about 
disruptive change or Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ because when the 
mechanisms of coordination change from the closed industrial paradigm then a 
change in the value and definition of particular forms of expertise invariably also 
follows. This unsettles and transforms current business models and practices. 
But these emerging interdependencies between markets and social networks 
also generate conditions for creativity and innovation. As companies such as 
Auran seek to engage consumers as co-creative participants and experts, this in 
turn will transform consumers’ expectations about the terms and conditions of 
that participation. Auran unfortunately misunderstood that social network market 
context through which these exchanges of co-creative expertise are co-
ordinated. 
 
Further research is needed to open the black box of co-creative expertise. We 
need to more precisely understand the different types of expertise that contribute 
to the shaping of these distributed co-creative network. Developing a typology of 
expertises may be helpful in this regard. We also need to unpack the precise 
bargaining processes and mechanisms that shape these co-creative expertise 
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